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Abstract
This paper explores an optimal personnel organization problem of monetary pol-
icy committees. First, I construct an analytically tractable model for monetary pol-
icy analysis which starts from decision-making in the monetary policy committee.
Using the model, I investigate the relationship between preference heterogeneity
among the committee members and the optimal structure of the monetary policy
committee. The result shows that it is optimal in general cases to appoint not
only inflation-minded (hawkish) persons but also output-minded (dovish) persons.
This is a theoretical justification for the fact that the actual monetary policy com-
mittees (e.g., MPC of Bank of England and FOMC) usually consist of both type
members as the empirical researches suggest. It also explains why the committees
have replaced the single policy makers in the actual central banks.
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1 Introduction
How should the monetary policy committees be organized? This paper addresses this
problem. Since about a decade ago, the central banks of many countries have established
the formal committees for decision-making on monetary policy one after another: Eng-
land, Japan, Sweden, Brazil and so on. This trend of central banking by committees
brings some important problems on monetary policy design to macroeconomists. 1 The
next three are representative ones. Why have the committees replaced the single policy
makers in most central banks? How should the committees collect the members’ views
and adjust the differences of their opinions? Who should be chosen for members of the
committees? In this paper, I focus on the third. 2
The question is significant in terms of the actual institutions. In most countries,
the procedure for appointing members of the monetary policy committee is one of legal
mandates. The Monetary Policy Committee of Bank of England consists of nine members.
Five are from the inside of Bank of England and four from the outside. FOMC of the
Federal Reserve System consists of twelve members. Five are district bank presidents, the
insiders, and seven are politically appointed governors, the outsiders. Thus, the optimal
personnel organization problem of monetary policy committees is one of the objects of
monetary policy design. This paper analyzes it in view of information imperfectness and
coordination behavior of the monetary policy committee.
There are empirical studies on a related topic which provide the interesting facts of
the actual monetary policy committees. The monetary policy committees often consist
of the outsiders and insiders and the outsiders are apt to prefer more flexible monetary
policy than the insiders. Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006) report that in the Monetary
Policy Committee of Bank of England, the outsiders tend to be more output-minded than
the insiders according to the voting records of the meetings. Meade and Sheets (2005)
find the empirical fact that in FOMC, the district bank presidents (the insiders) seems
more inflation-minded than the governors (the outsiders) on average.
Considering the facts above, this paper gives the next answer for the optimal personnel
organization problem. It is optimal in general cases to appoint not only inflation-minded
(hawkish) persons but also output-minded (dovish) persons. The mechanism for this is
as follows. Under imperfect information, along with coordination behavior, the mone-
tary policy committee fails to set the optimal level of nominal interest rate corresponding
to the economic state. It causes inefficient volatility of the demand side of the macro
economy. This also brings excessive volatility of inflation through the Aggregate Sup-
1Blinder (2004, 2007) provides a brief survey of this issue.
2I will show that the answer for the third solves the first.
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ply (AS) relation. The output-minded committee members play the role of mitigating
these effects, while the inflation-minded members balance monetary policy by stabilizing
expected and current inflation.
This paper’s argument is related to another problem. Despite the facts above, the
popular belief, which may be based on the established theory, is that central bankers
should concern primarily with inflation stabilization. Since the seminal work by Rogoff
(1985), many theoretical studies focus on the optimal delegation of monetary policy to
single policy makers. In various economic environments, they suggest that appointing
conservative central bankers, who place on a higher weight on inflation relative to the real
objectives (e.g. output and unemployment) than society, improves social welfare under
the discretionary policy regimes. 3 Adding to the theoretical studies, the discussions
on practice of central banking usually emphasis on importance of conservatism and it is
widely regarded as common sense on contemporary central banking.
So, why is the actual monetary policy not delegated to only (single) conservative
central bankers? This papers’ main result answers this. Under imperfect information,
to accommodate control error of the demand side of the economy, it is desirable in view
of social welfare to include output-minded persons in the monetary policy committee to
some extent.
There is a few existing studies on the appointments of the monetary policy com-
mittees. Waller (1992) analyzes the endogenous appointment of the monetary policy
committee by modeling the situation that the dovish and hawkish political parties bar-
gain over designating the monetary policy committee. Faust (1996) models the historical
argument that it was why FOMC was organized into a compound committee that this
structure was a solution to the conflict between the farmers and creditors over the redis-
tributive effect of inflation. He shows that balancing these heterogeneous interests brings
a better performance of monetary policy even for the majority under the peculiar voting
structure. However, as Blinder (2007) claims, these existing literature does not clarify
why in general countries, the monetary policy committees replace single policy makers
and why the actual central banks do not just follow the Rogoff’s (1985) suggestion and
appoint only a single conservative central banker. This paper’s result gives an answer
for these questions by showing the merit of preference heterogeneity among the members
and especially, the welfare-improving role of the output-minded members.
In the methodological aspect, this paper provides a way to model monetary policy by
committee easily. To conduct a simple welfare analysis, I construct a tractable forward-
looking model that starts from decision-making of monetary policy committees. The
3See, for examples, Adam and Billi (2008), Svensson (1997), Vestin (2006), Walsh (2003a) and etc.
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model consists of two parts. One part is a macroeconomic model which gives macroe-
conomic consequences of decision-making by committees and their welfare evaluation. I
adopt a basic New Keynesian model as the underlying macroeconomic model since it
has a rigorous micro foundation and is used for a benchmark model for contemporary
monetary policy analysis. However, according to the analysis later, it will appear that
the approach in this paper is applicable to a wide class of forward-looking macroeco-
nomic models. The other part is a microeconomic model which describes the process of
decision-making in the committee. I assume that the committee members play a vari-
ant of the beauty contest game, which was exploited by Morris and Shin (2002), in the
decision-making on setting nominal interest rate. This simple structure makes it possi-
ble to model a strategic situation in the monetary policy committee and shows that the
framework of this paper applies to the class of the games that have linear equilibrium
strategies as in many applied game-theoretic studies.
In the literature, several works deal with monetary policy by committees. Gelrach-
Kristen (2006) uses a (backward-looking) traditional Keynesian model and compares the
macroeconomic consequences of alternative aggregation rules of the committee members’
votes on economic conditions, which are honestly declared according to their information
without any strategic manipulations. Sibert (2003) and Mihov and Sibert (2006) use
a Lucas type Phillips curve and analyze the role of reputation for monetary policy by
committees in view of communication with the private sector. Therefore, the technical
innovation of this paper is that it gives the way to analyze the game structures in monetary
policy committees and connect it simply to various contemporary macroeconomic models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a benchmark model
and describes equilibrium. As the benchmark, I treat the case of homogeneous committee
members. Section 3 analyzes the optimal delegation of monetary policy in the benchmark
model, which reveals the desirable type of central bankers in the economic environment
this paper assumes. Section 4 extends the benchmark model to the case of heterogeneous
committee members which the empirical studies report. Based on the results in Section
3, I analyze the optimal personnel organization of monetary policy committees. Section
5 concludes.
2 Benchmark Model
This section provides a detail explanation of the benchmark model and the description of
equilibrium. The model can be partitioned into the two parts. One is a macroeconomic
3
model, which determines the consequences of monetary policy. The other is a microe-
conomic model that describes the process of decision-makings in the monetary policy
committee. By connecting the two models, we can discuss the welfare implication and
the design of the committee structure.
2.1 Macroeconomic Model
As the underlying macroeconomic model, I adopt a basic New Keynesian model. 4 The
model consists of the following two dynamic equations
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) + ut, (1)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + et, (2)
together with a monetary policy rule. Here, xt, it, πt, ut and et denote output gap, nom-
inal interest rate, inflation rate, demand shock and cost shock in period t, respectively.
Parameters σ, β and κ are positive constants, where σ is the degree of constant relative
risk aversion, β is the discount factor and κ is the impact of one unit of output gap on
inflation. The symbol Et denotes a mathematical expectation conditioned on information
available to private agents in period t. I assume that {ut}∞t=0 and {et}∞t=0 follow AR (1)
processes such that
ut = ρuut−1 + ϕt,
et = ρeet−1 + ψt,
where ρu, ρe ∈ [0, 1) and ϕt and ψt follow independently the normal distributions with
mean 0 and variance σ2ϕ and σ
2
ψ, respectively.
Equation (1), the dynamic IS curve, represents the Aggregate Demand (AD) relation
that is derived from the Euler equation of household. Equation (2), the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, is the AS relation which is a linear approximation of the firms’ optimiza-
tion condition and the dynamic equation of average price under price-stickiness. The
parameter κ depends on the structural parameters which represent the technology of
the firms, the degree of price-stickiness and so on. If necessary, we specify the function
form of the household utility function and the micro structure behind the New Keynesian
Phillips curve but for the time being, we treat κ itself as one of the structural parameters
for simplicity.
One of the reason why we use the New Keynesian model is that the model has good
and manageable property in view of modern central banking in that the macroeconomic
4For detail of a micro foundation of New Keynesian models, see Ch.5 of Walsh (2003b).
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dynamics is determined once a setting rule of the central bank’s policy instrument, it,
is specified. Many central banks today, as widely known, adopt nominal interest rate
as their policy instruments. So that, the most important part of decision-making in the
monetary policy committee is determination of policy interest rate. The New Keynesian
model is appropriate to incorporate it. The other reason is that welfare analysis is
meaningful in the New Keynesian framework because it has rigorous micro foundations
and thus clarifies the source of inefficiency in the market economy and the goal and role
of monetary policy.
Along the line of Woodford (2001), the social loss function is endogenously determined
as the second order approximation of household’s utility function and its function form
is proportional to
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(π2t + λx
2
t ),
where λ is the weight which society places on output gap relative to inflation as disutility.
The parameter λ depends on the structural parameters in the way that is determined
once we assume a particular micro foundation of the New Keynesian model. I treat,
however, λ as a structural parameter for analytical ease unless a specification is needed.
5 Since the purpose of this paper is to analyze an optimal institution design problem of
monetary policy committees, I focus only on the average performance of monetary policy.
Thus, I reset the social loss function to 6
L ≡ V [π] + λV [x], (3)
where V [π] and V [x] are asymptotic variances of inflation rate and output gap respec-
tively.
2.2 Monetary Policy Committee
Next, I set up the decision-making process of the monetary policy committee in this
model. The committee consists of N ≥ 2 members. Here, I assume that all the members
5The results of this paper are invariant as long as we specify a form of λ which depends on a usual
micro foundation of the New Keynesian model.
6The average social loss L can be obtained by
L = lim
β→1
(1− β)E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
π2t + λx
2
t
)
.
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are (ex-ante) homogeneous in this benchmark model. To make a decision on monetary
policy, they receive noisy signals on the economic conditions. Given realizations of signals,
each committee member j votes a level of nominal interest rate, ij, to maximize his/her
own payoff and then all voting rates are aggregated by a specific rule.
First, let us see the detail of the informational structure of the monetary policy
committee. As in the actual monetary policy procedure, I assume the situation that
decision-making on policy instrument setting in each period must be done with noisy
information about the economic state in the concerned period before it reveals. In the
end of period t−1, each member receives the two kinds of noisy signals on innovations of
demand shock and cost shock in period t. One is common and the other is idiosyncratic
signal. The common signals on innovations of demand shock and cost shock are of the
standard form such that
ϕct = ϕt + μt,
ψct = ψt + νt,
where μt and νt are independent and serially uncorrelated noises which are normally
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2μ and σ
2
ν , respectively. Each member knows
the distribution of μt and νt and that realizations of ϕ
c
t and ψ
c
t are common to everyone.
The common signals can be interpreted as well-balanced recognition among economists on
the future economic condition or the result of discussions in the committee which usually
depend on suggestion of the report by research staffs of the central bank. 7 In actual, the
monetary policy committees usually begin with staff reports on economic conditions. For
example, every meeting of FOMC begins with a staff report and discussion on economic
conditions. 8
Besides, there is probably idiosyncrasy among the committee members’ assessments
on future economic developments. Each committee member j receives idiosyncratic sig-
nals on innovations of demand shock and cost shock of the form such that
ϕjt = ϕt + ε
j
t ,
ψjt = ψt + η
j
t ,
where εjt and η
j
t are independent and serially uncorrelated noises which are normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and variance σ2ε and σ
2
η, respectively. They know the distribution
of the noise terms and that these are common to them but do not know realizations of
the others’ idiosyncratic signals. That is, idiosyncratic signals are private information of
7In this paper, to keep the model simple, I do not deal with the issues of communication.
8Chappell, McGregor and Vermilyea (2005) explains this point precisely.
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each member. For simplicity, I assume that similar to the private agents, the central bank
can observe innovations of demand shock and cost shock in period t once they realize in
the beginning of period t. 9
Second, consider the behavior of the committee members. I assume that each member
j votes a level of nominal interest rate in period t, ijt , to minimize the following loss
function
ljt = E
j
t−1
[
(1− r)(ijt − i∗t )2 + r
(
ijt −
1
N − 1
∑
k =j
ikt
)2]
,
where r ∈ [0, 1], i∗t is the level of interest rate in period t which would be set in optimal
monetary policy under perfect information and Ejt−1 is a mathematical expectation con-
ditioned on information available to member j in the end of period t− 1. The meaning
of this function form is that each member concerns with the weighted sum of accuracy of
his/her vote on interest rate (the first term) and the distance between it and the average
of the others members’ votes (the second term). Therefore, using the available informa-
tion, the committee members seek to balance the two objectives: to spot the genuine
optimal level of interest rate and to coordinate with the others. Thus, the parameter r is
interpreted as a measure of a motive for coordination or strategic complementarity. The
presence of the coordination motive among the committee members reflects that they
dislike standing out in the committee in that they care the position in the committee,
the relationship with the other members and the release of the voting record.
In this paper, I mean optimal policy for optimal discretionary policy. As usually seen
in the New Keynesian literature, the equilibrium interest rate in optimal discretionary
monetary policy under perfect information, i∗t , is the solution of the following linear-
quadratic problem
min π2t + λ
cx2t ,
s.t. xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) + ut,
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + et,
where the parameter λc > 0 is the relative weight that the committee members place on
output gap. Note that it is not necessarily identical to society’s weight. This preference
parameter can be thought to represent the underlying preference of the committee mem-
bers in that it represents their attitudes on desirable trade-off of monetary policy. The
9Thus, except the process of decision-making on policy instrument setting, this paper’s model is a
model with perfect information.
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solution of the problem above is 10
i∗t = σut + Φet,
where Φ = λ
cρe+(1−ρe)σκ
λc(1−βρe)+κ2 .
The game described above is a variant of the beauty contest framework exploited
by Morris and Shin (2002). In this setting, unlike Morris and Shin (2002), the target
each member seeks is not the true state of the economy but a variable determined by it.
However, the framework of Morris and Shin (2002) is applicable to this paper’s model
because of linearity of the target, i∗t , with respect to the state, (ut, et).
Finally, I set the aggregation rule of individual votes to the arithmetic mean:
it =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ijt . (4)
Although this rule is quite simple, it can easily grasp an aspect of compromise in the
monetary policy committee. Since the goal of this paper is not to find the optimal
aggregation rule but to investigate the optimal personnel organization of monetary policy
committee, I use this simple aggregation rule as a starting point of analysis of monetary
policy committee. I may adopt the weighted average rule for a generalization of the
arithmetic mean but it does not change the results of this paper.
2.3 Equilibrium
To calculate the equilibrium of the whole model, I first derive equilibrium of the sub-
game which describes decision-making of the monetary policy committee. The first order
condition of each committee member j’s problem is
ijt = (1− r)Ejt−1i∗t + rEjt−1
∑
k =j i
k
t
N − 1 . (5)
Along the line of Morris and Shin (2002), consider the following linear strategy of each
committee member j’s voting on the interest rate
ijt = σ
[
ρuut−1 + γuϕ
j
t + (1− γu)ϕct
]
+ Φ
[
ρeet−1 + γeψ
j
t + (1− γe)ψct
]
, (6)
where γu ∈ [0, 1] and γe ∈ [0, 1] are undetermined coefficients. 11 Let pμ = σ−2μ , pν =
σ−2ν , pε = σ
−2
ε , pη = σ
−2
η . I interpret them as measures of the precisions of the correspond-
10See Ch.11 of Walsh (2003b) for a detail explanation on the issue.
11According to the setting of this paper, this is enough to find equilibrium linear strategy. For a detail
of the calculation of equilibrium in global games with finite players, see Calvo-Armengol and de Marti
Beltran (2009).
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ing signals. Using pμ, pν , pε, pη, for each j,
Ejt−1i
∗
t = σ
[
ρuut−1 +
pε
pε + pμ
ϕjt +
pμ
pε + pμ
ϕct
]
+ Φ
[
ρeet−1 +
pη
pη + pν
ψjt +
pν
pη + pν
ψct
]
,
Ejt−1i
k
t = σ
[
ρuut−1 + γu
( pε
pμ + pε
ϕjt +
pμ
pμ + pε
ϕct
)
+ (1− γu)ϕct
]
+Φ
[
ρeet−1 + γe
( pη
pν + pη
ψjt +
pν
pν + pη
ψct
)
+ (1− γe)ψct
]
, for k = j.
Thus, substituting these equations into the right-hand side of (5) and comparing the
coefficients of (6), the undetermined coefficients turn out to be
γu =
(1− r)pε
pμ + (1− r)pε , γe =
(1− r)pη
pν + (1− r)pη ,
which give the solution of the subgame of decision-making by the monetary policy com-
mittee. Here, I investigate the properties of the response coefficients above.
Remark 1
∂γu
∂r
< 0,
∂γe
∂r
< 0,
∂γu
∂pε
> 0,
∂γe
∂pη
> 0,
∂γu
∂pμ
< 0,
∂γe
∂pν
< 0.
This is parallel to the analysis of Morris and Shin (2002). Since the importance of com-
mon information rises when the motive for coordination becomes larger, each committee
member then places a higher weight on the common signals relative to the private signals:
∂γu
∂r
< 0, ∂γe
∂r
< 0. Since private signals (common signals, resp.) become more informa-
tive relative to common signals (private signals) when the precisions of private signals
(common signals) increase, each member tends to depend on private signals (common
signals) more: ∂γu
∂pε
> 0, ∂γe
∂pη
> 0, ∂γu
∂pμ
< 0, ∂γe
∂pν
< 0.
Next, let us see equilibrium nominal interest rate and the consequent macroeconomic
dynamics. Using the solution of the subgame in the monetary policy committee, the
nominal interest rate set in equilibrium is determined by the aggregation rule (4) as
follows.
it = σ[ut + γuε˜t + (1− γu)μt] + Φ[et + γeη˜t + (1− γe)νt]
= i∗t + σ[γuε˜t + (1− γu)μt] + Φ[γeη˜t + (1− γe)νt], (7)
where ε˜t =
1
N
∑N
j=1 ε
j
t and η˜t =
1
N
∑N
j=1 η
j
t . The second and third terms of (7) repre-
sent the effects of imperfect information on interest rate setting in the monetary policy
committee.
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Now, macro dynamics of the model economy is given by AD relation, (1), AS relation,
(2), and monetary policy rule, (7). By the method of undetermined coefficients, I find
the solution of the system above. The equilibrium output gap and inflation rate are 12
xt = − κ
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 et −
[
γuε˜t +
γeΦ
σ
η˜t + (1− γu)μt + (1− γe)Φ
σ
νt
]
, (8)
πt =
λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 et − κ
[
γuε˜t +
γeΦ
σ
η˜t + (1− γu)μt + (1− γe)Φ
σ
νt
]
. (9)
Under perfect information, the equilibrium output gap and the inflation rate in the equa-
tions above are identical to those of the basic New Keynesian model with discretionary
monetary policy. The effect of coordination behavior vanishes if information is perfect
since every member shares the same information set with the others under perfect infor-
mation. 13
Calculating asymptotic variances of output gap and inflation rate, I obtain the social
loss in equilibrium by (3). 14
Proposition 1 In the benchmark model, the asymptotic variances of the output gap and
the inflation rate and the social loss are
V [x] =
[
κ
λc(1− βρe) + κ2
]2 σ2ψ
1− ρ2e
+
1
N
[
γ2uσ
2
ε +
(γeΦ
σ
)2
σ2η
]
+
[
(1− γu)2σ2μ +
(
(1− γe)Φ
σ
)2
σ2ν
]
, (10)
V [π] =
[
λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2
]2 σ2ψ
1− ρ2e
+
κ2
N
[
γ2uσ
2
ε +
(γeΦ
σ
)2
σ2η
]
+κ2
[
(1− γu)2σ2μ +
(
(1− γe)Φ
σ
)2
σ2ν
]
, (11)
L =
[( λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2
)2
+ λ
( κ
λc(1− βρe) + κ2
)2] σ2ψ
1− ρ2e
+
κ2 + λ
N
[
γ2uσ
2
ε +
(γeΦ
σ
)2
σ2η
]
+ (κ2 + λ)
[
(1− γu)2σ2μ +
(
(1− γe)Φ
σ
)2
σ2ν
]
.
12For a detail of the calculation, see Appendix A.
13In the case of perfect information, ε˜t = η˜t = μt = νt = 0 holds. Then, in (8) and (9),
xt = − κ
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 et, πt =
λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 et,
which are the equilibrium output gap and inflation rate in the basic New Keynesian model with dis-
cretionary optimal policy. Ch.11 of Walsh (2003b) provides the derivation and an explanation of the
issue.
14Appendix A provides a derivation of asymptotic variances of output gap and inflation rate.
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This seems somewhat complicated but the meaning is clear. The macroeconomic
volatilities presented in (10) and (11) are decomposed into the three parts as follows. The
first term is due to cost shock, the second term is due to noisy common information and
the third term is due to noisy private information. Therefore, the cause of the first term
is a fundamental element and those of the second and third terms are non-fundamental
elements.
Immediately, I obtain the following assertion which provides a welfare implication
about the committee size N in this benchmark case.
Corollary 1 In this benchmark model, asymptotic variances of output gap and inflation
rate are decreasing in the size of the monetary policy committee. Thus the social welfare
is increasing in it.
This is intuitively plausible. The larger the committee becomes, the more accurate
the averages of idiosyncratic information on the two shocks become since idiosyncratic
noises of information among the members are absorbed by averaging. In fact, the second
terms of (10) and (11) show that an increase of the committee size reduces the part of
macroeconomic volatilities due to idiosyncratic noises in the same order as N . Since it
is not costly to enlarge the monetary policy committee in the setting of this section, a
finite optimal size of the monetary policy committee does not exist. This mechanism for
Corollary 1 is the same as Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem. The part of the social loss
which noisy private signals generate goes to 0 as the committee size goes to infinity. It
indicates that the averages of private signals on the demand shock and the cost shock
converge to realizations of the two shocks in probability. In fact, in this model, the two
important assumptions of Condorcet’s jury theorem hold. First, I implicitly assume that
enlarging the size of the monetary policy committee is costless. This means that there is
no information acquisition cost. Second, the aggregation of information is costless since
private signals are used without strategic manipulations in this model.
Let us discuss the value of information. The next corollary shows the relationship
between the precision of private signals and social welfare.
Corollary 2
∂L
∂pε
≤ 0, ∂L
∂pη
≤ 0.
Corollary 2 indicates that an increase of the precisions of common signals always im-
prove the social welfare. While precise common information stimulates the coordination
motive of the committee members, precise private information does not so. Hence, a rise
11
in the quality of private signal has only the positive effect that it raises the accuracy of
the members’ forecast on demand shock and cost shock. The relationships between the
precisions of private signals and the social welfare are as below.
Corollary 3
∂L
∂pμ
≤ 0 iff pμ
pε
≥ (1− r)
[
1− 2
N
(1− r)
]
,
∂L
∂pν
≤ 0 iff pν
pη
≥ (1− r)
[
1− 2
N
(1− r)
]
.
Corollary 3 asserts that the marginal values of common signals are non-negative when
common signals are sufficiently precise relative to private signals and vice versa. It might
seem curious that the anti-transparency result can hold but I can explain this as follows.
15 Raising the precisions of common signals has two effects on the behavior of the
committee members. One is a direct effect such that the committee members can get
more precise information on economic developments and forecast more exactly the target
level of nominal interest rate, i∗t . The other is an indirect effect such that the committee
members become more dependent on the common signals as Remark 1 shows and it
increases the inefficiency of interest rate setting due to noisiness of common signals,
which brings larger macroeconomic volatility. Clearly, the former is positive one and the
latter is negative one. When the precisions of common signals are low, the marginal
effect of the latter is relatively large and thus the social welfare decreases as the common
signals become more precise.
3 Optimal Delegation Problem of Monetary Policy
Committees
This section deals with the optimal delegation of monetary policy, which has been one
of the most important issues of monetary policy analysis. Since the seminal work by Ro-
goff (1985), many researches on this topic support for optimality of conservative central
bankers under various environments. However, introducing decision-makings by com-
mittees under inperfect information makes a difference in this topic. I first analyze two
limiting cases to understand it.
15The mechanism for Corollary 2 presented below is similar to literature of global games, for example,
Morris and Shin (2002).
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3.1 Optimality of Conservatism: Limiting Cases
3.1.1 The Case of Serial Uncorrelation
First, I consider the case where the cost shock is serially uncorrelated and the information
of each committee member is imperfect, i.e., et = ψt and σ
2
μ, σ
2
ν , σ
2
ε , σ
2
η > 0. In this case,
the social loss function is
L =
[( λc
λc + κ2
)2
+ λ
( κ
λc + κ2
)2]
σ2ψ +
κ2 + λ
N
[
γ2uσ
2
ε +
(γeΦ0
σ
)2
σ2η
]
+(κ2 + λ)
[
(1− γu)2σ2μ +
(
(1− γe)Φ0
σ
)2
σ2ν
]
, (12)
where Φ0 =
σκ
λc+κ2
. Solving the first order condition, ∂L
∂λc
= 0, with respect to λc, I obtain
the optimal weight λ∗ such that
λ∗ = λ + (1− γe)2(κ2 + λ)σ
2
ν
σ2ψ
+
(κ2 + λ)γ2e
N
· σ
2
η
σ2ψ
. (13)
Equation (13) gives the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the benchmark model without serial correlation of the cost shock, the
optimal weight on the output gap is higher than the society’s weight. That is, it is optimal
to appoint a monetary policy committee which consists of more output-minded members
than society.
An elemental cause of this result is imperfectness of the information. Because ρe = 0,
the equilibrium output gap and the inflation in this case are
xt = − κ
λc + κ2
et −
[
γuε˜t +
γeΦ0
σ
η˜t + (1− γu)μt + (1− γe)Φ0
σ
νt
]
,
πt =
λc
λc + κ2
et − κ
[
γuε˜t +
γeΦ0
σ
η˜t + (1− γu)μt + (1− γe)Φ0
σ
νt
]
.
The first terms of the equilibrium output gap and the inflation rate in the expression
above are identical to those of the case of perfect information. The second terms of them
are generated from information imperfectness (and coordination motive) in the interest
rate setting. Note that the second term of the inflation rate is as κ times as that of the
output gap and κ is the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Thus, I find that the
control error of interest rate due to imperfect information affects the output gap directly
in the AD relation, (1), and then impacts the inflation through the AS relation, (2).
13
The effect mentioned above leads to the non-fundamental macroeconomic volatility:
the second and third terms of (12). So that, to reduce the volatility, it is beneficial to
appoint central bankers who place higher weights on output gap. This appears the second
and third terms in (13). The first term of (13) reflects the famous result in the literature
that sharing the relative weight with society is optimal under perfect information. 16
Therefore, the optimal weight given by (13) balances the benefit of raising the weight to
reduce the economic volatility due to common and idiosyncratic noise of the members’
information and its cost, excessive variance of inflation which the accompanying weak
response to the cost shocks brings.
Note that by the analysis above, information imperfectness requires flexible inflation
targeters for the committee members through the channel of control error of the demand
side.
I investigate the relationships between the optimal weight and the parameters, which
help me analyze the general case.
Corollary 4 If the information of the committee members on the cost shock is imperfect,
i.e., σ2ν > 0, σ
2
η > 0, then
∂λ∗
∂r
> 0,
∂λ∗
∂λ
> 0,
∂λ∗
∂κ
> 0,
∂λ∗
∂σ2ψ
< 0.
When the coordination motive among the committee members rises, their dependency
on the common information, 1− γe, also rises and inefficiency due to the common noise
increases. So that, ∂λ
∗
∂r
> 0. When the society’s weight on output gap is high, the optimal
weight correspodingly becomes higher: ∂λ
∗
∂λ
> 0. When an impact of output gap to
inflation rises, the control error of the demand side due to common and idiosyncratic noise
of information induces more excessive inflation. Thus, ∂λ
∗
∂κ
> 0. When the innovation
in the cost shock becomes larger, the marginal cost of raising the weight on output gap
(and thus weakening the response to cost shock) increases, which leads to a lower optimal
weight: ∂λ
∗
∂σ2ψ
< 0.
Next, let us see the relationships between the parameters on informational structure
and the optimal weight.
Corollary 5
∂λ∗
∂pη
< 0, (14)
∂λ∗
∂pν
≤ 0 iff pν
pη
≥ (1− r)
[
1− 2
N
(1− r)
]
. (15)
16I review the detail of this issue in the next subsection.
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According to (13), I find that both of changes in the parameters pη and pν have three
effects on the optimal weight λ∗:
∂λ∗
∂pη
= (κ2 + λ)
[
− 2(1− γe)∂γe
∂pη
· p
−1
ν
σ2ψ
+ 2
γe
N
· ∂γe
∂pη
· p
−1
η
σ2ψ
− γ
2
e
N
· p
−2
η
σ2ψ
]
, (16)
∂λ∗
∂pν
= (κ2 + λ)
[
− 2(1− γe)∂γe
∂pν
· p
−1
ν
σ2ψ
− (1− γe)2p
−2
ν
σ2ψ
+ 2
γe
N
· ∂γe
∂pν
· p
−1
η
σ2ψ
]
. (17)
Consider the meaning of (16). Note that ∂γe
∂pη
> 0. The first term of the bracketed part
is the indirect negative effect which is from the decrease of dependency of interest rate
setting on the common signal. The second term is the positive effect which is from the
increase of dependency of interest rate setting on the private signal. The third term is
the direct negative effect which is generated by the decrease of the economic volatility
due to noisiness of the private signal. It is easily shown that the third term dominates
the second term as long as r < 1. 17 Thus, the optimal weight is always decreasing in
the precision of the private signal on the cost shock.
The second assertion of Corollary 5, (15), is also intuitive. Note that ∂γe
∂pν
< 0. The first
term of the bracketed part of (17) is a positive effect owing to an increase of the members’
dependency on common signals. As in (16), the second and third terms are the direct
and indirect negative effects respectively. However, contrary to (16), the positive effect
can dominate the two negative effects when, for example, N is large and hence the third
effect is small. Recall that Corollary 3 suggests that when the precision of the common
signal is sufficiently small, an increase of dependency on it generates a dominantly large
volatility, which increases the social loss. This is because the optimal weight increases in
the precision of the common signal on cost shock when it is sufficiently noisy.
Corollary 6 The optimal weight on the output gap is decreasing in the size of the com-
mittee.
The mechanism which generates this result is similar to that of Corollary 1. When
the size of the monetary policy committee becomes larger, the cross-sectional noise of
the members’ information is absorbed by averaging the individual votes. The marginal
benefit of raising the relative weight on output gap then decreases, which makes the
optimal weight lower.
17When r = 1, γe = 0 and thus the second and third term vanish. Even in this case, the result does
not change by the negativity of the first term.
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3.1.2 The Case of Perfect information
To begin with, consider the case of perfect information, i.e., σ2ε = σ
2
η = σ
2
μ = σ
2
ν = 0.
The coordination motive is irrelevant in this case, so that the model is identical to the
popular version of the New Keynesian model with perfect information. This case had
been analyzed in literature. However, we review it briefly for comparison with the result
of this paper.
The results of Clarida et al. (1999) indicate that in the basic New Keynesian model
with perfect information, if the cost shock {et}∞t=0 is serially correlated, then the optimal
weight on output gap under discretionary monetary policy is lower than the social pref-
erence λ. In other words, it is optimal to appoint a central banker who dislikes inflation
more than society. In fact, by σ2ε = σ
2
η = σ
2
μ = σ
2
ν = 0, the social loss is reduced to
L =
[( κ
λc(1− βρe) + κ2
)2
+ λ
( λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2
)2] σ2ψ
1− ρ2e
.
The first order condition ∂L
∂λc
= 0 gives the optimal weight λ∗ such that 18
λ∗ = (1− βρe)λ,
which implies that λ∗ = λ when ρe = 0 and λ∗ < λ when ρe > 0. The intuition for this
result is as follows. Since et+j = ρ
j
eet +
∑j
i=0 ρ
i
eψt+j−i, if ρe > 0, the future values of the
cost shocks can be partially forecast by public. Noting that in the basic New Keynesian
model, the equilibrium inflation in inflation targeting under discretion is given by 19
πt+j =
λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 et+j,
the response coefficient is increasing in λc. Since the expected inflation rate in period
t + j at period t is
Etπt+j =
λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2ρ
j
eet,
the role above of λc becomes larger as ρe increases. Hence, intuitively, the rational agents,
who know that a conservative central banker (i.e., one with lower λc) will stabilize inflation
harder, expect stable future inflation. This behavior contributes to stabilizing current
inflation. Clearly, it disappears if ρe = 0.
Summing up, the existence of serial correlation of cost shock supports for appoint-
ing conservative committee members through the channel of stabilization of inflation
expectations.
18Vestin (2006) also derives the optimal weight on output gap in the case of perfect information.
19For a derivation, see Chapter 11 of Walsh (2003b).
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3.2 Optimality of Conservatism: The General Case
The general case where information is imperfect and the cost shock is serially correlated
is quite complex but I can analyze it with help of the limiting cases presented above.
For simplicity, I assume that ρeκ < σ(1−ρe)(1−βρe). 20 This condition is equivalent
to ∂Φ
∂λc
< 0. That is, we consider only the case where conservative central bankers react
to cost shock harder.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the social loss function L is convex with respect to λc. Then,
the optimal weight on output gap is
λ∗ = λ +
[σκ(1− ρe) + ρeλ]Λ− βρeκλ
κ− ρeΛ ,
where Λ =
(λ + κ2)
σ2
[σ(1− βρe)(1− ρe)− ρeκ]
[
γ2e
N
· σ
2
η
σ2ψ/(1− ρ2e)
+ (1− γe)2 σ
2
ν
σ2ψ/(1− ρ2e)
]
.
Proof.
See Appendix B.
I find by Proposition 3 that the parameter λ∗ can be both lower and higher than λ. In
fact, λ∗ = λ+(1−γe)2(κ2 +λ) σ2νσ2ψ +
(κ2+λ)γ2e
N
· σ2η
σ2ψ
> λ for ρe = 0 and λ
∗ < λ for sufficiently
large ρe because of limρe→1 λ
∗ = 0. Recall the two limiting cases. On one hand, serial
correlation of the cost shock brings expectations effect and lowers the optimal weight on
the output gap. On the other hand, imperfectness of the members’ information generates
extra economic volatility and requires flexible monetary policy. Since the optimal weight
in the general case balances the both effect, it is lower (higher, resp.) than society’s
weight when the former (the latter) dominates the latter (the former). Besides, since Λ
is small (large) when σ2η and/or σ
2
ν are small (large), I obtain the following remark.
Remark 2 In the general case, inflation-minded committee members improve social wel-
fare if their information on economic shocks is accurate. Otherwise, appointing output-
minded committee members is optimal.
Summing up, the results of this section suggest that both of the inflation-minded and
output-minded committee members have an advantage in improving the performance
of monetary policy. This fact hints the optimality of the compound monetary policy
committees, which is explored in the next section.
20This condition holds for usual calibrations of the New Keynesian literature.
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4 Optimal Structure of the Committee
This section studies the optimal structure of the committee. 21 In practice of monetary
policy, it is often pointed out that there is preference heterogeneity among members of
the monetary policy committees. This may be because each member has characteristic
background, career and thus principle for the goal of monetary policy, especially on
trade-off between inflation and real objectives.
4.1 Preference Heterogeneity of the Members
I assume that L members of the monetary policy committee place a higher weight on
inflation than the other members. Without loss of generality, I assume that the weight
on output gap of every member j ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} is λh, that of the other member k ∈
{L + 1, L + 2, ..., N} is λd and λh < λd. 22 I call {1, 2, ..., L} and {L + 1, L + 2, ..., N}
”Hawk group” and ”Dove group” respectively. For convenience, put H = {1, 2, ..., L} and
D = {L+ 1, L+ 2, ..., N}. For the time being, I assume that N ≥ 4 and 2 ≤ L ≤ N − 2,
which ensure that both the groups have at least two members and the beauty contest
frame games described below make sense. To address why the actual monetary policy
committees are usually amalgams of both the groups, this assumption will be relaxed
later by considering the non-strategic situation where the coordination motive among
the members does not exist.
The modification of the members’ preference generates heterogeneity of the problem
they face since the targets of the members are not homogeneous. By ρu = ρe = 0, the
levels of interest rate in period t in optimal policy under perfect information for the
hawkish and dovish members are respectively
ih∗t = σut + Φ
het, (18)
id∗t = σut + Φ
det, (19)
where Φh = σκ
λh+κ2
and Φd = σκ
λd+κ2
. 23 Equations (18) and (19) display the role of hetero-
21I abstract from serial correlation of demand shock and cost shock since it is not essential to under-
stand the role of imperfect information. This does not matter qualitatively although serial correlation
of cost shock generates the expectations effect mentioned above and hence increases the importance of
inflation stabilization quantitatively. Besides, the approach I will take is applicable to the case where
demand shock and cost shock are serially correlated. The qualitatively similar results will be obtained
in the case where the shock is serially correlated by a few modifications.
22Since I do not treat the issues of communication in this paper, this preference heterogeneity does
not cause Crawford and Sobel (1982) type strategic information transmission.
23Of course, I need to reset Φh and Φd to λ
hρe+(1−ρe)σκ
λh(1−βρe)+κ2 and
λdρe+(1−ρe)σκ
λd(1−βρe)+κ2 respectively when I treat
the case where the shocks are serially correlated.
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geneity of underlying preferences among the committee members. It makes a difference
between their responses to the cost shock. The members of Hawk group react to the cost
shock harder than the members of Dove group: Φh > Φd.
Since the target rates are distinct, I set up the problems of the committee members
in the both groups separately. I reset the loss function of each member j ∈ H to
ljt = E
j
t−1
[
(1− r)(ijt − ih∗t )2 + r
(
ijt −
1
L− 1
∑
m∈H\{j}
imt
)2]
and that of each member k ∈ D to
lkt = E
k
t−1
[
(1− r)(ikt − id∗t )2 + r
(
ikt −
1
N − L− 1
∑
m∈D\{k}
imt
)2]
.
The parameter r represents the degree of coordination motive with the other members
in the same group. In this setting, I assume that each members of both groups cares the
position in the same group and the relationship with her fellows.
All committee members in both the groups are assumed to minimize their own loss
function above. The first order conditions for both the problems are
ijt = (1− r)Ejt−1ih∗t + rEjt−1
∑
m∈H\{j} i
m
t
L− 1 , for j ∈ H, (20)
ikt = (1− r)Ekt−1id∗t + rEkt−1
∑
m∈D\{k} i
m
t
N − L− 1 , for k ∈ D. (21)
Note that the problems of both the groups are mutually independent since every
member does not pursue coordination with the members of the opponent group. Thus, I
consider the following linear strategies as in the benchmark model:
ijt = σ
[
γhuϕ
j
t + (1− γhu)ϕct
]
+ Φh
[
γhe ψ
j
t + (1− γhe )ψct
]
, for j ∈ H, (22)
ikt = σ
[
γduϕ
k
t + (1− γdu)ϕct
]
+ Φd
[
γdeψ
k
t + (1− γde )ψct
]
, for k ∈ D, (23)
where γhu , γ
h
e , γ
d
u and γ
d
e are undetermined coefficients.
Substituting (22) and (23) into (20) and (21), by the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients, I can find γhu , γ
h
e , γ
d
u and γ
d
e . I omit the detail of the calculation because it is long
and similar to the benchmark model. The undetermined coefficients turn out to be
γhu = γ
d
u =
(1− r)pε
pμ + (1− r)pε = γu,
γhe = γ
d
e =
(1− r)pη
pν + (1− r)pη = γe.
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Nominal interest rate in period t set by the committee is determined by (22), (23)
and (4) as follows.
it =
1
N
(∑
j∈H
ijt +
∑
k∈D
ikt
)
= σ
[
ut + γuε˜t + (1− γu)μt
]
+
[
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
]
et
+γe
[
qΦhη˜ht + (1− q)Φdη˜dt
]
+ (1− γe)
[
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
]
νt, (24)
where η˜ht =
 
j∈H η
j
t
L
, η˜dt =
 
k∈D η
k
t
N−L and q =
L
N
. The parameter q is the share of Hawk
group in the monetary policy committee and plays the most important role in this section.
Note that the committee tends to response harder against the cost shock when q is large
and vice versa.
As in the benchmark model, macroeconomic dynamics is determined by the system
(1),(2) and (24). Equilibrium output gap and inflation rate in period t are linear in the
(relevant) state variables in period t. In this case, they are et, ε˜t, η˜
h
t , η˜
d
t , μt and νt. By the
method of undetermined coefficients, I obtain the equilibrium output gap and inflation
rate as follows. 24
xt = − 1
σ
[
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
]
et − γuε˜t − γe
σ
[
qΦhη˜ht + (1− q)Φdη˜dt
]
−(1− γu)μt − 1− γe
σ
[
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
]
νt, (25)
πt =
[
1− κ
σ
(
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
)]
et − κγuε˜t − κγe
σ
[
qΦhη˜ht + (1− q)Φdη˜dt
]
−κ(1− γu)μt − κ(1− γe)
σ
[
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
]
νt. (26)
The equilibrium output gap and inflation rate in (25) and (26) nest those of the basic New
Keynesian model as the case where information is perfect and the members’ preference
are homogenous, i.e., λh = λd.
I can calculate asymptotic variances of output gap and inflation in the same way in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 In the presence of preference heterogeneity among the committee mem-
bers, asymptotic variances of output gap and inflation rate are 25
V [x] =
[
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
σ
]2
σ2ψ +
1
N
[
γ2uσ
2
ε + γ
2
e
(
q
(Φh
σ
)2
+ (1− q)
(Φd
σ
)2)
σ2η
]
24I omit the derivation because it is long but straightforward.
25I have to replace σ2ψ by
σ2ψ
1−ρ2e when I analyze the case of serial correlation.
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+[
(1− γu)2σ2μ + (1− γe)2
(
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
σ
)2
σ2ν
]
, (27)
V [π] =
[
1− κ
(qΦh + (1− q)Φd
σ
)]2
σ2ψ +
κ2
N
[
γ2uσ
2
ε + γ
2
e
(
q
(Φh
σ
)2
+ (1− q)
(Φd
σ
)2)
σ2η
]
+κ2
[
(1− γu)2σ2μ + (1− γe)2
(
qΦh + (1− q)Φd
σ
)2
σ2ν
]
. (28)
By (3), (27) and (28), I obtain the following result immediately.
Corollary 7 Given q, the asymptotic variances of the output gap and the inflation rate
are decreasing in N and thus so is social loss. That is, the larger the monetary policy
committee is, the social welfare is improved unless the proportion of the sizes of Hawk
and Dove group changes.
This is a variant of Corollary 1. Note that the substantial difference of the model in
this section from the benchmark model is the existence of preference heterogeneity among
the committee members. 26 Since the role of the ratio q is only to determine the response
of the monetary policy committee to the cost shock, it does not make a difference on
the role of the committee size N . Thus, in this model, enlarging the committee always
improves social welfare by mitigating the volatility due to noisy private signals of the
committee members.
4.2 The Optimal Personnel Organization
In actual, the members of the monetary policy committees are usually chosen from the
inside and outside of the central banks subject to the legal mandates which mention the
proportions explicitly. The empirical researches report preference heterogeneity between
both the groups and the results of the previous section tell us that this is meaningful
in view of social welfare. So, how should the seats of the committees be allocated to
both? The rest of this section addresses this question, that is, the optimal personnel
organization problem of the monetary policy committee. The approach is to find the
ratio q which minimizes the social loss function L, given the values of λh and λd.
4.2.1 Analytical Results
The analysis of the optimal ratio is slightly difficult but the most elemental results can
be obtained in the analytical way. First, I provide a characterization of the optimal ratio.
26The abstraction of serial correlation of cost shock does not affect this point.
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Proposition 5 Let the optimal ratio of the size of Hawk group to the whole of the com-
mittee be q∗. Then
q∗ = argmin
q′∈Q
|q′ − q˜|,
where Q = { 2
N
, ..., N−2
N
} 27 and
q˜ =
[
σκ− Φd(κ2 + λ)
]
σ2ψ − (Φh + Φd)(κ2 + λ) γ
2
e
2N
σ2η − Φd(κ2 + λ)(1− γe)2σ2ν
(Φh − Φd)(κ2 + λ)
[
σ2ψ + (1− γe)2σ2ν
] . (29)
Proof.
See Appendix C.
Proposition 5 asserts that the optimal ratio of the size of Hawk group to the whole
of the committee is the nearest one to some real number q˜. 28 This fact is important for
the analysis on optimal ratio q∗ since it provides the following useful result.
Remark 3 The optimal ratio q∗ is non-decreasing in q˜.
Remark 3 suggests that comparative statics about q˜ is enough to investigate the
relationships between the optimal ratio q∗ and the parameters. Indeed, quantitative
analyses of q∗ face the difficulty of discreteness of q but qualitative analyses of q∗ is easily
conducted by making use of continuity of q˜.
I next provide a simple but important limiting result. Let Θ = Φ
h
Φd
. Since hetero-
geneity of underlying preferences affects only the responses of the members’ target to the
cost shock as (18) and (19) show, I interpret Θ as a measure of the effect of preference
heterogeneity. This is a key element of the next proposition, which provides a neces-
sary condition for that it is optimal to organize the monetary policy committee into a
compound of hawkish and dovish persons. 29
27Later, in the discussion on Proposition 6, Q is reset to {0, 1N , ..., N−1N , 1}. See footnote 29 and
Appendix E.
28There is possibility of multiple optima. Since the social loss function L is quadratic in q, there are
two optimal ratios when q˜ corresponds the middle point of some two grid points. That is, both of two
ratios q− and q+ (q− < q+) are optimal if q˜ = q− + 1N (or equivalently, q˜ = q+ − 1N ). Here, I neglect
such a case.
29Since I adopt the beauty contest games in the process of decision-making in the monetary policy
committee, I assume here that both the two groups have at least two members. So, in this setting,
the monetary policy committee is always a compound. However, the discussion on Proposition 6 below
makes sense because it does not depend on the structure of the beauty contest framework substantially.
That is, similar results hold even under assumptions which allow the case where one group occupies the
whole committee. For a detail explanation for this point, see Appendix E.
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Proposition 6
1. q˜ ≥ 0 if and only if λd ≥ λ∗ + (Θ− 1)(λ + κ2) γ2e
2N
· σ2η
σ2ψ
.
2. q˜ ≤ 1 if and only if λh ≤ λ∗ − (1− 1
Θ
)(λ + κ2) γ
2
e
2N
· σ2η
σ2ψ
.
Proof.
See Appendix D.
To gain an intuition for Proposition 6, consider the case of perfect information: σ2ν =
σ2η = 0. I obtain the following corollary immediately from Proposition 6.
Corollary 8 Suppose that information of the committee members on the cost shock is
perfect, i.e., σ2η = σ
2
ν = 0. Then the following statements hold.
1. q˜ ≥ 0 if and only if λd ≥ λ.
2. q˜ ≤ 1 if and only if λh ≤ λ.
Corollary 8 has a very simple background. Note that by (13), the optimal weight λ∗
is equal to the social preference λ when the committee members’ information is perfect.
Consider the case of λd ≤ λ. All the committee members place lower or equal weights
on output gap than the optimal weight in this case. Hence, to approximate interest rate
setting to optimum with respect to the policy weight, it is suboptimal to appoint only
the members of Dove group. I similarly interpret the case where λh ≥ λ.
The mechanism for the first assertion of Proposition 6 is similar to this. However, the
assertion indicates that the necessary condition for optimality of compound committees
is valid is stricter than that of the case of perfect information. This is because there is
extra social loss due to the hawkish members’ weak interest in stabilizing the volatility
of output gap from information imperfectness. So that, strong preference heterogeneity
(i.e.,large Θ) pushes up the lower bound of λd for optimality of the compound committees.
I interpret the second assertion of Proposition 6 in the same way.
The results of the previous section and Proposition 6 reflect the merit of appoint-
ing liberal (i.e., output-minded) central bankers, while the literature on this topic largely
suggests the optimality of conservative central bankers. Proposition 6 asserts that a com-
pound monetary policy committee is optimal unless the bias of the members’ preferences
is very small. It can be regarded as a theoretical justification for that the actual monetary
policy committees consist of heterogeneous members with respect to preferences over the
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goals of monetary policy. It also answers for why the committees have replaced the single
policy makers in recent years by showing the merit of preference heterogeneity. 30
Next, I investigate the relationships between the optimal ratio q∗ and the parameters.
The results which can be analytically obtained are the following.
Proposition 7
1. The optimal ratio q∗ is non-decreasing in N and σ2ψ and non-increasing in λ.
2. Suppose that q˜ ≥ 0. Then, q∗ is non-increasing in r if (1+Θ)(1−r)
N
≤ 2.
3. Suppose that information of the committee members on the cost shock is perfect,
i.e., σ2η = σ
2
ν = 0. Then, q
∗ is non-decreasing in κ if λh ≤ λ ≤ λd.
Proof.
See Appendix F.
These are intuitively plausible according to Corollary 4 and 6. Consider the first as-
sertion. Since enlarging the committee accommodates inefficiency of interest rate setting
due to imperfect information, it lowers the value of adding output-minded members. So
that, q∗ is non-decreasing in N .
Intuitively, q∗ seems to be non-increasing in r unconditionally since the coordina-
tion behavior strengthens the volatility due to noisiness of common information. There
exists, however, the possibility that an increase in r lowers the dependency of the com-
mittee members on their noisy individual information and it improves social welfare. The
full characterization of the relationship between r and q∗ is somewhat complex but the
sufficient condition presented in the second assertion of Proposition 7 is simple and in-
formative. Unless the size of the committee is extremely small, noisiness of individual
information is considerably absorbed by aggregation. 31 This removes the possibility
mentioned above.
To gain an intuition for the third assertion of Proposition 7, at first, consider the
case where a single policy maker conducts monetary policy under perfect information.
Tillmann (2008) claims that too conservative central bankers are more harmful than too
liberal ones. This is because the optimization condition of discretionary policy under
perfect information by a single policy maker
xt = − κ
λc
πt
30Heterogeneity of members’ tastes is one of the substantial features of committee decision-making.
31The actual sizes of the monetary policy committees are about 10. I provide a few examples later.
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implies that excessive conservatism (i.e. very low λc relative to λ) leads to enormous
volatility of output gap. Thus, excessive liberalism generates small inefficiency relative
to excessive conservatism. This mechanism works also in this paper. By λh ≤ λ ≤ λd, the
hawkish and dovish members are the too conservative and liberal central bankers respec-
tively. To raise q means that the monetary policy committee becomes more conservative.
As the equation above indicates, a rise in κ reduces the safety of excessive liberalism
(relative to excessive conservatism) by increasing volatility of output gap. Since the ben-
efit of appointing liberal central bankers in Proposition 2 vanishes in the case of perfect
information, an increase in κ makes the optimal ratio q∗ larger monotonically.
4.2.2 Numerical Results
Let us investigate other important issues by a numerical approach. First, I set the baseline
parameter value. This paper does not aim to obtain quantitatively conclusive results and
the qualitative results are invariant with the baseline values. As the baseline value, I set
β = 0.99, σ = 1, λ = 0.25, κ = 0.05. I follow Walsh (2003b) about β, λ and κ. The
value of σ is irrelevant as seen in the analytical results above. Even if it is incorporated
that λ is endogenously determined by particular micro foundations, it does not change
the following discussion basically. Since an empirically valid values of r, λh and λd are
not available, fix r = 0.2, λh = 0.15 and λd = 0.65. These specifications do not make
a difference in the qualitative results. I set σ2ψ = 1 since what is important is not the
absolute value of σ2ψ but the ratio of σ
2
ν or σ
2
η to it. Because the values of σ
2
ν and σ
2
η
affects the results significantly, I examined several cases about them. I use σ2ν = 0.6 and
σ2η = 0.8 as a baseline value and report the results based on them because I obtained the
qualitatively same results with other values. The size of the monetary policy committee
varies among countries. For example, the numbers of committee members of FOMC,
the MPC of Bank of England and the Policy Board of Bank of Japan are 12, 9 and 9,
respectively. I set N = 10 here, for it keeps q = L
N
numerically simple.
At first, I analyze the relationship between the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve, κ, and q˜.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates it. This result is robust with respect to other parameters’ values.
The reason why q˜ is hump-shaped in κ is as follows. An increase in κ has three effects
on q˜. First, even in the case of imperfect information, the channel of the third assertion
of Proposition 7 is effectual. Second, a decrease in the ratio of the response coefficients
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on the cost shock in target rates of Hawk group and Dove group, Θ, reduces the relative
benefit of appointing the output-minded persons rather than inflation-minded persons
for holding the inefficiency of imperfect information and coordination behavior. This
is interpreted as below. The larger the trade-off of monetary policy is, the closer the
attitudes about inflationary pressure of inflation-minded and output-minded group are.
It reduces the merit of Dove group members for accommodating the volatility due to
inefficient interest rate setting. Third, an increase of impact of output gap in inflation
enlarges the effect of inefficient interest rate setting on inflation as Corollary 4 shows.
The first and second effects dominate the third effect for small κ and vice versa for large
κ. 32The second and third do not exist under perfect information, which leads to the
monotone result, i.e., the third assertion of Proposition 7.
Next, let us see the relationship between the degree of information imperfectness (σ2η
and σ2ν) and the optimal ratio, q
∗.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 shows the result. By and large, the optimal ratio q∗ decreases in σ2η and σ
2
ν .
It is intuitively plausible since the merit of increasing dovish members is generally large
when the inefficiency of imperfect information is large. In detail, the optimal ratio is
monotonically decreasing in σ2η for a fixed σ
2
ν but it is not necessarily so in σ
2
ν for a fixed
σ2η. The background of this asymmetric result is the asymmetric results of Corollary 5.
While noisiness of the private signal always lowers the optimal weight on output gap and
hence heightens the optimal ratio, noisiness of the common signal can make the converse
effect when it is sufficiently intense. Thus, for a given σ2η, the optimal ratio can decrease
in the intermediate values of σ2ν in Figure 2.
5 Concluding Remark
Incorporating that monetary policy is conducted by committee brings various problems
about the institution design of monetary policy to macro economists. This paper deals
with one of them: optimal personnel organization problem of monetary policy commit-
tees. The results tell us that there is a merit of appointing liberal central bankers when
32In this example, the range of κ in which the third effect dominates the first and second effects is not
so realistic in view of the empirical evidences. However, this paper focuses only on the mechanism that
provides the result above.
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the central bank can not perfectly control the demand side of the economy because of
imperfect information on economic shocks. This provides a theoretical justification for
the fact that the actual monetary policy committees usually consist of members with
heterogeneous preferences. It also explains why the committees have replaced the single
policy makers.
One of the remaining problems along this paper’s direction is how large the monetary
policy committees should be. This is important for practice of monetary policy but is
not easy to solve in formal models. Along the line of this paper, the key mechanism
for determination of the optimal size may be a harmful effect of common information
which is augmented by adding committee members. Morimoto (2009) shows that the
existence of coordination behavior may break Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem and the
finite optimal size of the committee is determined. Although Morimoto’s (2009) solution
is one plausible approach, there can be other distinguished one.
There is possibility of another extension. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Gerlach-
Kristen (2008) report that the outsiders of the BOE’s MPC have, on average, the asym-
metric preferences in that they are apt to avoid raising nominal interest rate harder than
lowering it. This fact is intuitive in a sense and should be incorporated into the optimal
organization problem of the monetary policy committees.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Derivation of (8),(9),(10),(11)
In the benchmark model, macroeconomic dynamics of the artificial economy is given by
the following system of stochastic difference equations.
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) + ut, (30)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + et, (31)
it = σ[ut + γuε˜t + (1− γu)μt] + Φ[et + γeη˜t + (1− γe)νt]. (32)
Since the relevant state variables in period t are et, ε˜t, η˜t, μt and νt, the solution will be
of the form
xt = Axet + Bxε˜t + Cxη˜t + Dxμt + Exνt, (33)
πt = Aπet + Bπ ε˜t + Cπη˜t + Dπμt + Eπνt, (34)
where Ak, Bk, Ck, Dk and Ek (k = x, π) are undetermined coefficients. Substituting
(33),(34) into (30),(32) and then (32) into (30) and comparing the coefficients of both
sides, I obtain
Ax = ρeAx − Φ− ρeAπ
σ
, Bx = −γu, Cx = −γeΦ
σ
, (35)
Dx = −(1− γu), Ex = −(1− γe)Φ
σ
.
Substituting (33),(34) into (31) and comparing the coefficients of both sides, I obtain
Aπ = βρeAπ + κAx + 1, Bπ = κBx, Cπ = κCx, Dπ = κDx, Eπ = κEx. (36)
Solving the first equations of (35) and (36), I obtain
Ax = − κ
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 , Aπ =
λc
λc(1− βρe) + κ2 .
Thus, I obtain the equilibrium output gap and inflation rate in period t in the text.
Finally, I calculate asymptotic variances of output gap and inflation rate. By et =
ρeet−1 + ψt, asymptotic variance of et is
σ2ψ
1−ρ2e . Besides, since et, ε
j
t , η
j
t , μt and νt are
mutually independent, each covariance of them is zero. Noting the two facts above, I
find asymptotic variance of output gap in the text. Similarly, I can calculate asymptotic
variance of inflation rate in the text.
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
At first, I find the condition for L to be a convex function of λc. Differentiating L with
respect to λc formally, I obtain
∂L
∂λc
=
κ
[λc(1− βρe) + κ2]3
{
[− κ(1− βρe)λ + λcκ]
σ2ψ
1− ρ2e
+
κ2 + λ
N
(γe
σ
)2
[λcρe + (1− ρe)σκ][ρeκ− (1− ρe)(1− βρe)σ]σ2η
+(κ2 + λ)
(1− γe
σ
)2
[λcρe + (1− ρe)σκ][ρeκ− (1− ρe)(1− βρe)σ]σ2ν
}
.
Put
Λ =
(λ + κ2)
σ2
[σ(1− βρe)(1− ρe)− ρeκ]
[
γ2e
N
· σ
2
η
σ2ψ/(1− ρ2e)
+ (1− γe)2 σ
2
ν
σ2ψ/(1− ρ2e)
]
.
Then, Λ > 0 since I assume that σ(1− βρe)(1− ρe) > ρeκ here. I obtain
∂L
∂λc
=
κ
[λc(1− βρe) + κ2]3
· σ
2
ψ
1− ρ2e
{
[κ− ρeΛ]λc − κ(1− βρe)λ− σκ(1− ρe)Λ
}
.
It implies that the condition for ∂
2L
∂λc2
is κ > ρeΛ.
Therefore, I assume that κ > ρeΛ. Under this condition, the solution λ
∗ of ∂L
∂λc
= 0 is
λ∗ =
κ(1− βρe)λ + σκ(1− ρe)Λ
κ− ρeΛ > 0.
After some calculations, it can be reduced to
λ∗ = λ +
[σκ(1− ρe) + ρeλ]Λ− βρeκλ
κ− ρeΛ .
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
The optimal ratio q∗ is defined as
q∗ = argmin
q′∈{ 2
N
,...,N−2
N
}
{
V [π] + λV [x]
}
.
Note that according to (31) and (33), social loss V [π] + λV [x] is a quadratic function
of q with a positive coefficient of the second order term. Consider the continuation of
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V [π] + λV [x] with respect to q and let the solution of
∂(V [π]+λV [x])
∂q
= 0 be q˜. Then, q˜
must satisfy
{
2
[
σ − κ
( q˜Φh + (1− q˜)Φd
σ
)][
− κ
σ
(Φh − Φd)
]
σ2ψ
+κ2
γ2e
N
[(Φh
σ
)2
−
(Φd
σ
)2]
σ2η + 2κ
2(1− γe)2
( q˜Φh + (1− q˜)Φd
σ
)(Φh − Φd
σ
)
σ2ν
}
+ λ
{
2
( q˜Φh + (1− q˜)Φd
σ
)Φh − Φd
σ
σ2ψ
+
γ2e
N
[(Φh
σ
)2
−
(Φd
σ
)2]
σ2η + 2(1− γe)2
( q˜Φh + (1− q˜)Φd
σ
)(Φh − Φd
σ
)
σ2ν
}
= 0.
Solving this with respect to q˜, I obtain (29). 33 Since discrete convexity of V [π] + λV [x]
with respect to q, the optimal ratio q∗ must belong to the following set
{
q−, q+
∣∣∣∣∃L˜ ∈ N, 2 ≤ L˜ ≤ N − 3, L˜N = q− ≤ q˜ ≤ q+ =
L˜ + 1
N
}
∪
{
2
N
,
N − 2
N
}
.
Moreover, since V [π] + λV [x] is quadratic in q and quadratic functions are symmetric
with respect to their axises, I find that q∗ is the nearest element of { 2
N
, ..., N−2
N
} to q˜.
Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
Using (15), the numerator of (29) becomes
[
σκ− Φd(κ2 + λ)
]
σ2ψ − (Φh + Φd)(κ2 + λ)
γ2e
2N
σ2η − Φd(κ2 + λ)(1− γe)2σ2ν
=
σ2ψ
Φd
[
λd − λ− (Θ + 1)(κ2 + λ) γ
2
e
2N
· σ
2
η
σ2ψ
− (κ2 + λ)(1− γe)2 σ
2
ν
σ2ψ
]
=
σ2ψ
Φd
[
λd −
(
λ∗ + (Θ− 1)(κ2 + λ) γ
2
e
2N
· σ
2
η
σ2ψ
)]
.
This shows the first assertion. Next, q˜ ≥ 1 if and only if
[
σκ− Φd(κ2 + λ)
]
σ2ψ − (Φh + Φd)(κ2 + λ)
γ2e
2N
σ2η − Φd(κ2 + λ)(1− γe)2σ2ν
≥ (Φh − Φd)(κ2 + λ)
[
σ2ψ + (1− γe)2σ2ν
]
.
33I omit the detail of the calculation since it is long but straightforward. It is available on request.
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Dividing the both sides by Φhσ2ψ, I have
λh + κ2 −
(
1 +
1
Θ
)
(κ2 + λ)
γ2e
2N
· σ
2
η
σ2ψ
≥ λ + κ2 + (1− γe)2(κ2 + λ)σ
2
ν
σ2ψ
,
which is reduced to
λh ≥ λ∗ −
(
1− 1
Θ
)
(κ2 + λ)
γ2e
2N
· σ
2
ν
σ2ψ
.
It completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Appendix E: Supplementary Note to Proposition 6
Proposition 6 provides a necessary condition for optimality of a compound committee
but in the model of the main text, as a matter of form, I adopt the assumption which
excludes the possibility that one group occupies the whole committee. However, this
setting does not spoil the significance of the assertion of Proposition 6. I show it in this
supplementary note by providing the settings which allow the case where only one group
occupies the whole committee.
First, consider the case of r = 0. Since there is no coordination motive among the
members, I may assume that 0 ≤ L ≤ N . Under this assumption, I can treat the
case where the monetary policy committee is occupied by only one group. The set
Q in Proposition 5 is hence modified to {0, 1
N
, ..., N−1
N
, 1}. Note that the assertion of
Proposition 6 holds in this setting according to its proof in Appendix D.
There is another setting which brings the same result as Proposition 6 in this paper.
Morimoto (2009), which explores the relationship between coordination behavior among
the members and the optimal size of the monetary policy committee, adopts the following
loss function of each member as the payoff structure in the committee:
Ejt−1
[
r(ijt − i∗t )2 + (1− r)
(
ijt −
1
N
N∑
k=1
ikt
)2]
.
In this setting, each member j can partially control the secondary objective, 1
N
∑N
k=1 i
k
t
since it contains her own voting rate, ijt . Therefore, by extending the setting to the case
of preference heterogeneity as in this paper, I can treat the case where the monetary
policy committee is occupied by only one group. Along the line of Morimoto (2009), in
this case, there is a unique equilibrium strategy such that for j ∈ H and k ∈ D,
ijt = σ[ρuut−1 + γuϕ
j
t + (1− γu)ϕct ] + Φh[ρeet−1 + γeψjt + (1− γe)ψct ],
ikt = σ[ρuut−1 + γuϕ
j
t + (1− γu)ϕct ] + Φd[ρeet−1 + γeψjt + (1− γe)ψct ],
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where γu =
(1−δ)σ−2ε
(1− r
N
)(σ−2μ +σ−2ε )−r(1− 1N )
σ−2μ +Nσ−2ε
N
and γe =
(1−δ)σ−2η
(1− r
N
)(σ−2ν +σ−2η )−r(1− 1N )
σ−2ν +Nσ−2η
N
. It is
obvious that although these γe and γu are different from those of this paper’s model, the
same result as Proposition 6 in this paper holds by the same discussion.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 7
I show the first assertion as follows. It is immediately obtained from (29) that q∗ is
non-decreasing in N and non-increasing in λ. By (29), I obtain
∂q˜
∂σ2ψ
=
(Φd + Φh)(κ2 + λ) γ
2
e
2N
σ2η +
[
(σκ− Φd(λ + κ2)) + Φd(κ2 + λ)
]
(1− γe)2σ2ν
(Φh − Φd)(κ2 + λ)(σ2ψ + (1− γe)2σ2ν)2
.
Since Φh > Φd by Φd = σκ
λd+κ2
, Φh = σκ
λh+κ2
and λd > λh, I obtain that ∂q˜
∂σ2ψ
≥ 0.
Next, I provide a proof of the second assertion. Since I assume that q˜ ≥ 0 here, it is
a sufficient condition for the assertion that the numerator of (29) is decreasing in r. Let
us define the following function f : [0, 1] → R.
f(r) = (Φh + Φd)γ2e
σ2η
2N
+ Φd(1− γe)2σ2ν , for every r ∈ [0, 1].
Then, after some calculations, I obtain
f ′(r) = −∂γe
∂r
· Φ
d
pν + (1− r)pη
[
2− (1 + Θ)(1− r)
N
]
.
Since ∂γe
∂r
is negative, this proves the second assertion.
I finally prove the third assertion. By (29), under perfect information, I obtain
q˜ =
σκ− Φd(κ2 + λ)
(Φh − Φd)(κ2 + λ) =
λd − λ
(Θ− 1)(κ2 + λ) ,
where Θ = λ
d+κ2
λh+κ2
. Note that q˜ can be regarded as a function of κ2. Differentiating q˜ with
respect to κ2, I obtain
∂q˜
∂κ2
= −
(λd − λ)
[
∂Θ
∂κ2
(κ2 + λ) + (Θ− 1)
]
(Θ− 1)2(κ2 + λ)2 .
By ∂Θ
∂κ2
= λ
h−λd
(λh+κ2)2
, I obtain
∂Θ
∂κ2
(κ2 + λ) + (Θ− 1) = −(λ− λ
h)(λd − λh)
(λh + κ2)2
.
This implies that ∂q˜
∂κ2
≥ 0 as long as λh ≤ λ ≤ λd. The proof is completed. Q.E.D.
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